The Impact of Unions on the Labor Market for White and Minority Youth by Harry J. Holzer
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE IMPACT OF UNIONS ON THE LABOR MARKET
FOR WHITE AND MINORITY YOUTH
Harry J. Hoizer
Working Paper No. 633




I would like to thank Richard Freeman and James Medoff for their
advice during the course of my research. I also benefitted greatly
from discussions with Charles Bremer and David Guzman of the A.
Phillip Randolph Institute and with Foster Stringer of RTP, Inc.
The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program
in Labor Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the author
and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #633
February 1981
TheImpact of Unions on the Labor Market for White and Minority Youth
ABSTRACT
This paper presents estimates of the effects of unions on the wages of
young black and white males who are both union and nonunion workers. It also
presentsestimates of union effects on employment for these groups, as well as
theirunion membership rates. While unions have a very substantial, positive
effect on the wages of young union workers, particularly for young blacks, they
have a negative effect on the wages of young blacks who are not unionized. The
effects of unions on employment are negative for both groups and especially
for blacks.
As for the relative access to unionized employment, young blacks within
the labor force have membership rates that are roughly comparable to those of
young whites. However, rates for young blacks appear to be somewhat lower
after accounting for differences in rates of labor force participation
between young blacks and whites. Young blacks also continue to be under—
represented in the crafts and construction industries, which are heavily
unionized,while being overrepresented in the relatively nonunionized,
low—wage service sector. These results suggest that increasing the access of







(617) 495—3290To analyze the impact of unions on the youth labor market in general,
and on the minority youth market in particular, three distinctgroups must
be considered: employed workers who are union members, employed workers
1/
who are nonunion, and the unemployed. The impact of unions will then de-
pend on their effects on the wages of both union and nonunion workers, their
effects on overall employment, and the numbers ofyoung blacks and whites who
2/
obtain union membership. When all of these factors are considered together,
unions might either mitigate or exacerbate differentials betweenyoung blacks
and whites in wages and employment that would exist in their absence because
of discrimination and/or differences in abilities and skills.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the wage and employment ef-
fects of unions for young black and white males, comparing them to each other
3/
and to older cohorts in the black and white populations. To do this, I
present a theoretical framework that considers the effects of unionism
on the supply of and demand for labor, and consequently onwages and employment.
I then estimate wage equations that contain independent variables forunion
membership of individuals, as well as separate equations for union and nonunion
workers which consider the proportions of individual's SMSA (StandardMetropoli-
tan Statistical Area) that are unionized.4' The proportion unionizedvariable,
when used in a sample that includes only nonunionworkers, provide estimates of
theimpactof unions on the nonunion sector. The SMSA variable is alsoincluded
in the employment equations that are estimated.
All of these equations contain controls for thepersonal characteristics
of these individuals, and some contain controls for othercharacteristics of
SMSAs that are correlated with the proportion unionized. Theequations are es-
timated separately for black and white males,ages 16 through 24, as well as for—2—
older white and black males. Most of the wage equations are estimatedonly for
blue—collar workers, and consider only the proportion unionizedamong produc-
tion workers; the employment equations, on the other hand, are estimated for
the entire population of each group and consider proportion unionized for all
workers.
I also compare the abilities of young blacks and whites to obtain
union membership by analyzing the percentage unionized of differentage groups
across regions, occupations, and educational groups. Finally, I use some of
these estimates to compute the aggregate effects of unions on thewages and
employment of the young white and black populations as a whole.
The main results of this analysis can be surimiarized as follows:
1.The union—nonunion wage differential is larger foryoung workers
than for older ones, and it is somewhat larger foryoung blacks than
for young whites.
2. The proportion of unionization in an SMSA raiseswages for young
black and white union members and also for white nonunion workers;
but wages of young nonunion blacks fall in heavily unionized SMSAs.
3. Employment falls for white youth and especially for black youth
as the proportion of unionization in an SMSA rises.
4. The rates of union membership in the labor force as a whole, and
within most educational, occupational, and regional subgroups, are
quite similar for young blacks and whites. However, the rates for
blacks appear to be lower after accounting for differences in rate of
labor force participation between young blacks and whites. Further-
more, young blacks continue to be underrepresented in the heavily
unionized crafts and in the construction industry, while being over—
represented in the relatively nonunionized, low—wage service sector.—3—
5. Changes in economy—wide rates of union organization would raise
the overall wages and lower employment for both young blacks and
whites.
In the first section of the paper, the theoretical implications of
unions for wages and employment of young blacks and whites are discussed. The
second section presents the results of the various wage and employmentequa—
tions that are computed. The third section contains union membership figures
for various groups in the young black and white populations. In the fourth
section, results from the previous two sections are used to compute the net
effects of unions on wages and employment for these populations. The fifth
section contains a summary and some conclusions.
I.Theoretical Implications of Unions
In its simplest version, neoclassical theory predicts that unions
raise wages and lower employment along an aggregate demand curve for labor.
Youth employment would be especially reduced, since unions would eliminate
the low—wage jobs that would otherwise be available to young people.
When the union and nonunion sectors are considered separately, the
situation becomes more complex. Johnson and Mieszkowski were the first to
use a general equilibrium model to determine the impact of unions on wages
5/
in the nonunion sector. In their model, the restricted demand for labor
in the union sector produces an excess supply of labor in the nonunion sector
which, in a general equilibrium model, depresses wages there.6' There are, how-
ever, other effects which may counteract the excess supply of labor. These
include: (1) a higher demand for the products of nonunion firms and therefore
a higher demand for labor there; (2) a possible net movement o capital to the
nonunion sector; and (3) a threat effect" whereby nonunion employers raise—4—
wages to preclude the possibility of union organization withintheirownfirms.
The first effect occurs because unions raise the costs of production and there-
fore the prices of goods in the union sector above those in the nonunionsector,
which shifts product demand from the former to the latter. The second effect
occurs only if: a) the union sector is relatively more capital—intensive than
the nonunion sector, and b) the elasticity of substitution in the production
process of the union sector is low. If both of these conditions are met, the
movement of capital to the union sector as a substitute for labor in the pro-
duction process (i.e., the "substitution effect")may be dominated by the move-
ment of both labor and capital to the nonunion sector because of the shifting
demand to that sector (i.e., the "scale effect"). But even when these condi-
tions are not met, the "threat effect" may still raise nonunionwages above
what they would be in the absence of unions.
These effects can be better illustrated through the formula for the
elasticity of labor demand in an industry that faces an infinitely elastic
supply of capital:
(1) =afl+(1 —
where is the elasticity of the demand for labor with respect to the wage
rate in industry j; c. is the proportion of total production costs accruing
to labor; ii. is the price elasticity of demand for the products of industry j;
and o. is the elasticity of substitution in production for that industry. For
a given proportional wage increase in the union sector, employment there
declines by the proportion .Thedirect shift in demand to the nonunion
sector will raise employment by < ;thus, this effect above
cannot fully offset the shift in labor supply.7' But for o. sufficiently low,—5---
capital will be diverted to the nonunion firms of industry j, and the wages
of workers in these firms will be higher in the presence of unionism in this
industry than in its absence. A "threat effect" might further reinforce this
result.
But this analysis is simplistic because it assumes that the union and
nonunion sectors are both parts of the same ndustry. It is more likely that
the excess supply of labor falls in industries other than j which happen to be
located in the same geographical area as the unionized firms of industry j; and
the demand effect will then be less useful in counteracting it. For the shift
in demand now depends on the cross—price elasticityxjk rather than fl., i.e.,
dw. dw. demand will rise in the nonunion sector byxik— rather than by a1
w. w.
J J
It is quite likely that ik< i'.; formany industries (e.g., the trade and
service industries), the cross—price elasticity of their products with respect
to those of heavily unionized industries are likely to be quite low. Therefore,
the level of unionism in the geographical unit which constitutes the local labor
market is highly relevant for the nonunion worker there, independently of the level
of unionism in his industry. It is the former through which unions affect labor
supply in the nonunion sector, and the latter through which they affect labor
demand. Thus, when controlling for the level of unionism in the area, the impact
of the level of unionism in an industry on the wages of a nonunion worker there
should be positive, reflecting only demand and threat effects, while the impact
of unionism in the area will depend on the relative strengths of the negative
supply effect and positive threat effect.8" It should be noted that threat
effects can exist for both the industry and the area; the use of industry and
area wage surveys by large firms in determining their wages lends support to
this view. It should also be noted that area unionism is much more likely to
affect blue—collar than white collar workers since unionism is more prevalent—6—
amongthe former and since the local labor market is generally more relevant
for supply of the former than the latter.
By focusing on unionism within areas instead of industries, this anal-
ysis can be extended to a disequilibrium context; i.e., one in which wage
rigidities prevent the excess supply of labor from being fully employed at
a lower wage in the nonunion sector. This possibility is illustrated in
Figure 1 below.
Figure 1
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[nthe absence of unions, wages are W0 and employment is L0 in
each sector. But unions raise wages in the union sector to and restrict
employment to L. With the rightward shift in the supply of nonunion
labor, employment there would have to rise to L to keep the overall level
of employment at its preunion level; this would occur only if the supply
of labor were perfectly inelastic and if wages fell to W3. With an elas-
tic supply of labor, wages would fall to W2 and employment would rise to
L2 in this sector; there would be no observed unemployment, but a lower over-
all labor force participation rate and therefore a lower employment/popula-
tion ratio would result.—7—
The introduction of wage rigidities causes unemployment in the labor
force as well as lower overall employment. If wages fall only to W1, un-
employment will be L —L1.In this case, nonunion wages will be lower and
unemployment will be higher than in the absence of unions. It i also pos-
sible that wages will remain at W0 in the nonunion sector, causing unemploy-
ment to rise to L —L0;or that wages will fise to W because of the threat
effect, causing unemployment to rise to L —L.
Finally, it is likely that wage and employment effects will be stronger
in some groups than for others. In particular, young workers, and especially
young blacks should be among the most seriously affected by the excess supply
of labor in the nonunion sector. With a shortage of jobs there,young people
will be absorbed into the labor force more slowly thanmight otherwise be
the case, and the large number of labor force entrants andreentrants would
raise unemployment significantly. Young union members might also havehiher
unemployment, since seniority provisions favor older members and therefore
raise the likelihood of layoff for younger members.
As for young blacks, their problems may be compounded by lower skills
and/or discrimination. Affirmative Action programs may be less effective
in the nonunion sector, wnere establishment size is generally smaller and
compliance more difficult to enforce than in the union sector. Therefore,
young blacks may be less likely to find employment in this sector than young
whites, and only at lower wages when it is found.
II. Estimation of Wage and Employment Equations
The first issue to be addressed by empirical analysis is the degree
to which unions do, in fact, raise the wages of young black and white union-
ists above those of nonunionfsts. Table 1 presents means and standard—8—
deviations of wages in the union and nonunion sectors as well as the re—
suits of wage equations that were estimated using the data on individuals from
the Current Population Survey (CPS) of May, 1978. The equations are of
the usual semilog form:
(2)2,nW. =aX.+ bUN. + e
1 1 1
WhereW is the individual's hourly wage, X1'iis a vector of the ith indivi-
dual's characteristics, UN is a dummy variable representing union member-
ship, and e is the error. The coefficient b can be interpreted as
2n(W /W) =2nW—2n; i.e., as the proportional union/nonunion wage U u flu
differential. Both the means and the equations are estimated separately
for whites and blacks aged 16 through 24 and for those who are older;
there are also separte equations for all workers and for blue—collar work-
ers.
Part B of Table 1 shows that union wage differentials are larger for
young workers than for older workers. They are also larger for blacks than
for whites in both the younger and older cohorts, although the difference
for the younger is just marginally significant.1 The larger differential
for blacks does not, of course, imply that blacks earn wages within unions
that are higher or even equivalent to those of whites; it may only mean that
there is less racial inequality in the union sector than in the nonunion
one. The latter notion is tested explicitly with the estimation of wage
equations that include a dummy variable for being black rather than for
union membership:
" = aX+ cR + U1
Equation (3) is estimated separately for the union and nonunion sectors as
well as for the different age groups and occupational groups, but blacks and—9—
whites are included together in the sample.
Part C of Table 1 shows that racialwage differentials among young
blue—collar workers persist in both the union andnonunion sectors, and that
the differential appears to be somewhatlarger among nonunion workers. For
older workers in both the union and nonunionsectors racial differentials
also exist, with larger differentials onceagain evident among nonunion workers.
The effects of proportion unionized onwages are estimated separately
for white and black union and nonunionworkers, ages 16 through 24 and 25 through
64 in the blue—collar sector. The impact ofproportion unionized on wages is
first estimated without controlling for other laborsupply and demand shift
factors in the following equation:
(4) thW. aX. + fP + e. ik ik k ik
where Wik is the wage of the ithinclividual in the kthSMSA. k is the proportion
of production workers unionized in an individual's SMSA.11'The equations are
estimated only for workers who reside in the largest 98 SMSAssince these are
the only ones for which estimates of proportion unionizedare available.
This limiting of the sample also creates a need for more observations,
particularly among young blacks. Therefore, the equations are estimated from
the merged CPS files of May 1973—75 and also of May 1976—78 foryoung workers..
Results from both data sets are presented here because of differences between
1"!
the two sets of estimates for young blacks. The results, as well as means
and standard deviations on wages, are presented in Table 2.
The proportion unionized in an SMSA has a significant,positive effect
on the wages of union members for all race andage groups. But for nonunion
workers, the impact of proportion unionized in an SISA isgenerally less posi—
tive than for union workers; and foryoung, nonunion blacks the impact on wages
is strongly negative. This is true even for the coefficientin the 1976—78—10—
TABLE., 1
EFFECTS OF UNION MEMBERSHIP ANDRACE ONWAGES
OF
BLACK ANDWHITE MALES
WhiteMales B Lack Males
16—24 .25—64 16—24 25—64
A.Means and Standard
Deviations of Wages
Union, all workers 5.50 7.28 5.46 6.25
(2.49) (4.40) (2.15) (3.56)
Union, blue—collar 5.87 7.17 5.47 6.12
(2.42) (3.94) (2.18) (2.70)
Nonunion, all workers 4.07 6.88 3.66 5.15
(2.05) (4.57) (2.19) (3.45)
Nonunion, blue—collar 3.91 5.47 3.32 4.23
(1.88) (3.45) (2.13) (2.39)
B. Union Wage Effects
All workers .274 .122 .317 .159
(.017) (.008) (.059) (.023)
Blue—collar .296 .197 .367 .213
(.017) (.009) (.066) (.026)
Union Nonunion
16—24 25—64 16-24 25—64
C. Racial Wage Effects
All Workers —.042 —.032 —.049 —.121
(.045) (.016) (.025) (.015)
Blue—collar —.081 —.072 —.096 —.093
(.047) (.018) (.028) (.017)
Note: Computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population
Sr1 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., May 1978). Dependent vari-
able in each regression of Parts B and C is log (aveage
hourly eanings). Each regress.ion includes age, age ,education,
education ,anddummies for one—digit occupational industry,
region, residence in an SMSA, and full—time employment. Stu-
dents, self—employed, and agricultural workers are omitted from
the sample. Sample sizes are 4,323 for young whites, 437 for
young blacks, 17,797 for older whites, and 1,991 for older
blacks.—11—
TABLE 2
EFFECTS OF PROPORTION UNIONIZED ON WAGES

















Note: Dependent variable ineachregression is log (hourly earnings).
Each regression includes all of the controls listed in Table 1,
with the exception of the SMSA dummy. The sample is also the
same, and is limited to the 98 largest SMSAs.
A. CPS May 1976—78
White Males, Aes 16—24Black Males, Ages 16—24
B. CPS May 1973—75
Union Nonunion Union Nonunion
5.46 3.53 4.60 2.91
(2.45) (1.71) (2.43) (1.59)
.437 .188 .724 —.199
(.169) (.110) (.476) (.349)
.442 .347 .512 .499
969 2202 159 283
4.67 3.23 4.09 2.94
(1.88) (1.72) (1.29) (1.58)
.229 .421 .264
185
(.095) (.082) (.279) (.252)
.299 .272 .400 .282
1245 2180 172 278
White Males,Ages 25—64Black Males,Ages 25—64
























sample, which is not significant because of the small sample size foryoung
blacks.
In order to look more closely at therelationship of union and non-
union wages to proportion of an SMSA unionizedfor young workers; the SMSAs
are divided into four discretecategories of proportion organizedamong pro-
duction workers. Mean wages ofyoung, blue—collar whites and blacks in
these categories are shown in Table 3. Thewages of black union members
show some upward movement,Particularly in the earlier sample. But fornon-
union blacks a fairly strong downward trend isevident in both samples.
These results do not change substantially whencontrolling for some
other labor supply and demand shift factors foran SMSA. The results of the
following equation are shown in Table 4 foryoung black and white nonunion
workers:
(5) 2nW.k aXIk + fDk ÷gS+ eik
where Dk and Sk are vectors of labor demand andsupply shift factors for
the kth SMSA, respectively. The demand shift factorsinclude the overall
unemployemnt rate; and index of industry structure thatweights the propor-
tion of each industry's national employment thatis accounted for by young
people by the proportion of each SMSA'semployment that the industry accounts
for; and the average annual rate of growthQfper capita income for the SMSA
between 1960 and 1970. Supply shift factors other thanproportion unionized
are the proportions of blacks and teenagers in the population.The propor-
tion of female—headed households is also includedto control for potential
13/
"neighborhood effects" on labor supply and demand. All of these factors
are considered exogenous with respect to the individual'swages.
In order to deal with the differences inestimates between the two
samples, Parts A and B in Table 4 present estimates ofequation (5) that are—13—
TABLE 3
AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS FOR WHITE AND BLACK BLUE-COLLAR
WORKERS, AGES16-24, UNION ANDNONUNION
BYPROPORTION OF SMSA UNIONIZED
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derived from the May CPS tapes, 1973—75 and 1976—78 respectively; Part C
then presents averages of the two esimtaes based on the following formulae:
_SE +SE SE•SE
(6)
— 21 12 SE*=
1 2
SE+SE SE+SE
1 2 1 2
wheref is the coefficient on proportion unionized, SE is its standard error,
and the subscripts refer to the different samples. The formulae are based on
a Bayesian procedure that weights each individual coefficient by the standard
error of the other in producing an average of the two.
Table 4 shows that the effect of proportion unionized in an SHSA on
the wages of young, nonunion blacks remains substantially negative even after
controlling for the other supply and demand characteristics of SMSAs. The
second column in the table presents results from an equation in which the
continuous proportion unionized variable is replaced by dummies for the dis--
Crete categories used in the previous table. The results for blacks are
fairly consistent with those of Table 3; the drop in wages is clearly seen
here for the third and fourth categories. For young, nonunion whites, on
the other hand, there appears to be a significant positive effect of propor-
tion unionized on wages when controlling for supply and demand shift factors.
Turning now to the effects of unionization on employment, Table 5
shows the results of employment equations which take the following form:
(7)E. =Y. +hP +e. ik ik k ik
where Eik is a dummy for employment of the ith individual in the kth SNSA;
ik is a vector of personal characteristics which omits those characteristics
of Xik that are only defined for the employed (e.g., occupation and industry);
and k is the proportion of all workers in an SMSA who are unionized)'
Equation (7) is therefore a linear probability model for the employment of
an individual.1' It is estimated separately for older white and black males—15—
TAJL 4
EFFECTS OF PROPORTION UNIONIZED IN SMSA ON WAGES OF NONUNION
BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS, AGES 16-24, WHEN CONTROLLING FOR
CHARACTERISTICS OF SMSA




















































Note: Dependent variable in each regression is log (hourly earnings). Each
regression includes controls listed in Table 1, with the exception of
the SMSA dummy, as well as controls for demand (overall unemployment
rate, index of industry structure, average annual rate of growth in
per capita income) and supply (proportion of blacks, teenagers, and






























usingthe CPS tapes of May1976and March 1978; while for younger males the
Survey of Income and Employment (SIE) from March 1976 and the CPS of March
1978 are used. The STE is basically a larger version of the March CPS of that
year; it is used once again because of the sample size problems for young
males.
Table 5 shows that the proportion of'n SMSA that is unionized has
a negative effect on employment for everyone except older black males, The
effects on the young are stronger than those on the older groups for either
race, and the strongest effect appears to be that for young blacks, especially
in the 1978 sample.
Table 6 shows the employment/population ratios for young white and
black males in each of the four categories of proportion unionized. It
shows a decline in employment for both whites and blacks in each data set
as unionism rises. The decline is sharper for blacks than for whites, par-
ticularly in the fourth category. It is also interesting to note that em-
ployment increases between 1976 and 1978 in all categories for whites, but
it decreases for blacks in all categories except the first one, This ex-
plains the sharp rise in the magnitude of the negative coefficient on unionism
for blacks between 1976 and 1978; it also suggests a secular worsening of the
employment situation for young blacks in the heavily unionized areas,
The linear probability models for employment of young whites and
blacksare also estimated in equations of the following form:
(8)EikaY.k +jDk+ +
efk
where Dk and S.usethe vectors of labor demand and supply shift factors as
before.Among the personal characteristics controlled for here are a family
income variable, a dummy variable for not living with parents, and interaction
between the two, and a dummy for being part of a family that receives welfare.Means and standard deviations of
employment
% Unionized, SMSA
























EFFECTS OF PROPORTION UNIONIZED IN SMSA ON EMPLOYEMNT OF



















C. CPS March 1978


















Note: Dependent variable in each regression is a dummy variable for
employment. Thesample includes all in the population except
for students.—18—
TABLE6
EMPLOYMENTRATIOS FOR BLACK ANDWHITEMALES, AGES 16—24
BY PROPORTION UNIONIZED IN SMSA













The results are shown in Table 7. As before, Part C shows a weighted
average of the results presented from the tapes in Parts A and B. The first
column shows large and significant negative effects on employment for young
whites in both samples. The black coefficient from the 1976 samples is of
approximately the same magnitude as the coefficient for whites, although the
smaller black sample causes a standard error which is larger on the former.
From the 1978 sample the black coefficient remains more highly negative than
that for whites, as does the weighted average in Part C. The second column
shows results from an equation which contains dummies for porportion organized
categories rather than a continuous variable. The results from each sample
show a definite drop in employment in the fourth category which is sharper
for blacks than for whites.
To summarize, high rates of unionization in SMSAs appear to raise
wages for white and black unionists and also for nonunion whites, but its
effect on the wages of nonunion blacks appears to be quite negative. The
unionization of an SMSA also has a strong negative effect on the employment
of young whites and especially young blacks. These effects persist even
when controlling for various other characteristics of labor supply arid demand
in an SMSA. Of course, the controls may be incomplete; but the evidence
strongly suggests that unions lower both the wages and employment of young,
nonunion blacks, especially relative to their white counterparts.
There are two potential explanations Of this relative decline in
both wages and employment for nonunion blacks; each explanation is consistent
with the supply shift theory presented above. The first would imply a greater
shift in the supply of labor for blacks and for whites; the second would imply
a queue of unemployed in which whites obtain employment more quickly and at
higher wages than blacks because of better skills and/or discrimination. The—20--
TABLE 7
EFFECTS OF PROPORTION UNIONIZED IN SMSA ON EMPLOYMENT OF
WHITE AND BLACK MALES, AGES 16—24, WHEN CONTROLLING FOR
CHARACTERISTICS OF SMSA ANDFAMILYINCOME
Black
1 2 1 2
















































Note: Dependent variable in each regression
The sample includes all in the population except
dude those listed in Table 5, the SMSA controls
various family income controls (a dummy variable









listed in Table 4, and



























is a dummy variable for—21—
two explanations are certainly not mutually exclusive and there is evi—
dence in support of both. The first explanation is consistent with the
evidence of higher union wage effects for blacks presented here and by
16 / Ashenfelter; but it is unlikely that the differential favorihg young
blacks in Table 1 is great enough to fully explain the large relative de-
cline in both wages and employment for nonu'nion young blacks. The first
explanation is also consistent with the evidence presented below of lower
access to unionized jobs for young blacks than for young whites in heavily
unionized areas, thereby creating a greater supply of nonunion blacks. The
second explanation is consistent with evidence of a longer duration of non—
17/ employment for young blacks than for young whites.
III. Union Membership Rates for Young Blacks and Whites
Until now, the impact of unions on wages of young blacks and whites
in both the union and nonunion sectors have been considered. It is also
important to consider the distribution of young blacks and whites between
these sectors, as well as the implications of the distribution for the
access of blacks to unionized employment. There is a rather extensive
literature that describes the history of blacks in unions; it focuses on
the exclusion of blacks from many craft unions intheearly years of the
AFL, and the inclusion of blacks in the mass—production industrialunions
of the ClO during the 1930s and 1940s. This literature also describes
the demise of "formal exclusion" in the l950s and 1960s, and the persis-
tence of "informal exclusion" of blacks, particularly from the construc—
18/
tion craft unions. More recently there has been discussion of "re—
cruitment" and "screening" barriers faced by young blacks which limit
19 /
theiremployment in both craft and industrial unions. There has also—22—
been a growing literature on the effects ofvarious legal and institution—
al remedies for informal exclusion, suchas the proliferation of court
imposed timetables for integration of construction craft localsacross
20/
the country. But this literature has largely been from a leal rather
than an empirical perspective. It is thereforeimportant to consider
rates of union membership for younger and order blacks and whitesacross
various occupational, regional, and demographicgroups.
Union membership rates were computed for blacks and whites between
the ages of 16 and 24 as well as for three older cohorts fromthe CPS for
May 1978. The results appear in Table 8. Membership is lowest in the
youngest cohort for both races; this is especially true for blacks, who
have experienced rapid growth of educational attainment andwhite—collar
employment relative to older cohorts. Within the youngest cohort, blacks
have slightly higher overall union membership rates thanwhites, but the
difference is not statistically significant. Foryoung blue—collar workers,
only black service employees have significantly higher membership rates.
Union membership is also higher for young blacksamong white—collar work-
ers; high school and college graduates; residents of the Northeast and
North Central regions; as well as residents of central cities. Of course,
some part of the rather large regional and urban membership differential
is probably due to higher concentration of blacks in blue—collar occupa-
tions and higher rates of unionism within the white—collar and service
sectors. It is important to note that higher rates of unionism for whites
in construction and among blue—collar workers in general characterize
older cohorts but not the younger ones.
However, these results must be qualified in two ways. For one
thing, membership rates computed only for those in the labor force ig-
nore the higher rates of nonparticipation among young blacks than amongTABLE 8
PERCENT ORGANIZED, 1978, FOR WHITE AND BLACK
MALES IN THE LABOR FORCE
Region Education
Total NE NC S W
-
Coil HS CS Construction
White Males, .162 .172 .191 .098 .189 .116 .206 .096 .181
ages 16—24 (.005) (.012) (.010) (.010) (.011)(.022) (.007) (.009)(.018)
Black Males, .177 .338 .276 .088 .23 .146 .246 .077 .175
ages 16—24 (.018) (.055)(.044)(.025) (.037) (.071)(.024)(.030)(.058)
White Males, .309 .360 .359 .203 .319 .159 .344 .379 .418
ages 25—64 (.004) (.007) (.007) (.008) (.007)(.007) (.004)(.007) (.011)
Black Males, .355 .487 .535 .262 .370 .226 .430 .350 .343
ages 25—64 (.009)(.021) (.026) (.014)(.021) (.024) (.014)(.012)(.032)
Occupation Residence
WC BCR Op Lab Service CC Sub Non—M
White Males, .072 .197 .215 .235 .221 .076 .186 .177 .139
ages 16—24 (.012) (.007) (.012) (.011) (.012) (.014)(.012) (.008) (.010)
Black Males, .141 .193 .234 .234 .182 .148 .242 .170076
ages 16—24 (.052)(.021) (.058) (.042) (.038) (.039) (.028)(.043) (.035)
White Males, .153 .456 .429 .541 .452 .361 .325 .328 .285
ages 25—64 (.005) (.003) (.009) (.006) (.009) (.009)(.008) (.006) (.006)
Black Males, .320 .434 .447 .491 .353 .362 .448 .330 .236
ages 25—64 (.018) (.012)(.024) (.022) (.027) (.025)(.015) (.021) (.020)
Note: Computed from CPS, May 1978. Regions are Northeast (NE), North—
Central (NC), South and West; educational groups are College (coil),
high school (HS), and grade school (GS); occupational groups are
blue—collar (BC), crafts (CR), operations (Op), laborers (Lab),
and service. Residence groups are central city (CC), suburban (sub),
and non—metropolitan (Non—M).—24—
young whites. When membership is calculated for the entire population
rather thanjust the labor force, the total rate foryoung whites becomes
l2.l7while that for young blacks becomes 10.8%. It is alsolikely that,
if such adjustments were made for specificdemographic groups, large and
significant differentials favoring whites wouldemerge. For instance,
the membership differential favoringyoung whites without high school
diplomas over their black counterparts would probably become quite sig-
nificant if rates within educationalgroups were adjusted for differences
in participation.
The second problem that needs to be noted here is that,although
membership rates within occupational groups are comparable foryoung whites
and blacks, their distributions between these occupations remainquite
dissimilar. Calculations performed on data for the CPS ofMay 1978 show
that 19.7% of young whites who are employed in theprivate sector are
craftsmen and 11.7% work in construction. Thecorresponding figures for
young blacks are 10.5% and 8.5%, respectively. The differentials favor-
ing whites in these well—paying, heavily unionized sectors therefore persist
despite the major efforts made by courts in the past decade to impose
timetables for black entry into construction craft union locals. The
data also show that only 13.9% of young whites in the private sector
are employed in service occupations, which are often low—paying and less
heavily unionized; the figure for young blacks is 21.8%. Thus the ab-
sence of membership differentials within most blue—collar occupations does
not imply equal access to the occupations themselves for young blacks.
The continued low concentration of young blacks in construction
and the crafts is particularly puzzling in light of the relativelyhigh
21/
enrollment in craft apprenticeship programs. It is clear, then, that—25—
many black apprentices do not ultimately achieve journeymen status or em-
ployment in the skill crafts. There appear to be two closely related ex-
planations for this result: (1) unionized construction has been depressed
in the North throughout the 1970s, thereby decreasing the number ofopen-
ings available for young craftsmen of either race, and (2) the monitoring
and enforcing of federally designed or court imposed timetables for craft
locals and contractors has been weak and realtively unsuccessful.Thus,
when openings become available they are more often filledby young whites
entering through informal channels than by blacks who travel the formal
22/
apprenticeship route.
Finally, the relative ability of young blacks to obtain union
membership as overall union membership rises in an SMSA is analyzed in
Table 9.This table shows that the proportion of employed workers that is
unionized is higher for blacks than for whites in each of thecategories
of proportion unionized. However, the proportion of the overallpopulation
that is unionized is lower for blacks in all but one category, and is sub-
stantially lower in the category with the highest overall leval of unionism.
It therefore seems as though black accessmay not be keeping pace with over-
all rates of unionism in the heavily unionized SMSAs.
IV. The Overall Effects of Union Organization forYoung Blacks and Whites
Given the effects of unions on wages in the union and nonunionsectors
and an employment for young blacks and whites; andgiven their respective
rates of union membership; the overall effects of unionorganization on wages
and employment for these groups can be calculated. Thewage of employed young
blacks can be written as a geometrically weightedaverage of their union and
nonunion wages: P (1—p ) — = u,B u,B
B u,B—26—
TABLE 9
UNION MEMBERSHIP FOR BLACK AND WHITE MALES,









in SMSA Blue—Collar .
1—15 .129 .108 .096 .221 .190 .137
16—25 .223 .195 .160 .312 .252 .159
26—30 .345 .273 .229 .333 .342 .209
31+ .386 .371 .263 .432 .365 .183—27—
where u,B is the probability of young blacks being unionized and where
WuB and WnuB are the average wages in each sector. By taking logs we obtain
an arithmatic average of the wages:
(10) nt =P ,nW + (1 —P ) 2,nW B u,B u,B u,B nu,B
which can also be written as:
(11) nW ,nW + P (ZnW —2nW ) B nu,B u,B u,B nu,B
Comparable equations can be written for yourg whites.
The effects of the economy—wide rate of unionism on black wages äan
be analyzed by taking first differences with respect to these rates:
A9,nW AnW AP
(12) B nu,B + u,B
A
=
AP Al (2nWuB -2nWB)
A9nW AnW AP A2,nW AnW +0 u,B— nu,B.+ u,B ,. u,B— nu,B
£u,B\ AP AP
'
LW' LW AP U U U U u
where P is the overall rate of unionization in the labor force. U
The calculations were performed for the sample of young white and
black, blue—collar workers in the largest 98 SMSAs. The effects of
changes in unionism on nonunion wages can be obtained from Table 4; the
coefficients from the first column we used here. The effects on union
wages we obtained from the first column of Table 2. The union—nonunion
wage differential in logs is obtained from the coefficients presented in
Table 1. Changes in union membership for young blacks and whites that occur
with changes in overall rates of unions were obtained from a simpleregres-
sion of union membership for individuals on rates of unions in theirrespec-
tive SMSAs among blue—collar workers.
The results of these calculations appear in Part A of Table 10.
These results show that a 10% rise in rates of unionis among all blue—
collar workers would raise overall wages of young whites by about 5% and
those of young blacks by about 8%. Part B of Table 10 presents the employ——28—
TABLE 10
OVERALL EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN UNIONS ON
WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT OF YOUNG BLACKS AND W-IITES
A. Union Wage Effects for Blue—Collar Workers
Whites IBlacks
CPS, May 1976—78 .719 1.037
CPS, May 1973—75 .465 .584
Weighted Results .543 .724
B. Union Employment Effects for Entire Population
WhitesBlacks
CPS, March 1978 —.204 —1.78
SIE, March 1976 —.216 —.162
Weighted Results —.208 —.486—29—
ment coefficients from column 1 of Table 7; they imply that a 10% rise in
rates of unionism in the labor force would lower young white employment
by about 2% and lower young black employment by about 5%.Ofcourse, the
estimates from the different samples show that there is considerable un-
certainty over the exact magnitude of the effect in each case.
It should be noted that union membership among young blacks can be
improved without raising overall rates of unionism by improving their access
to areas of the economy that are currently unionized. This would not only
raise the wages of those who become unionized, but it would also lower the
supply of young black nonunion workers, thereby raising their wages and/or
employment. Furthermore, new organizing activity could take place in sectors
which are currently nonunion and where blacks are heavily concentrated,
such as the service sctor. This would strongly raise the number of low
wage blacks who benefit from a given increase in overall organization, but
this latter policy is more likely to produce lower employment among those
who remain nonunion.
V. Summary and Conclusion
This paper presents estimates of the effects of unions on the
wages of young blacks and whites, both union and nonunion, as well as their
effects on employment for these groups. The estimates suggest that unions
raise the wages of their young blue—collar workers substantially, but that
they also reduce the wages of young, nonunion blacks. Employment is also
reduced for young whites and especially for young blacks. These results
seem to be consistent with a theory which claims that unions cause an excess
supply of nonunion labor, particularly for blacks.
The ability of young blacks to obtain union membership has also—30—
discussed. It was shown that within the labor force membership rates for
young whites and blacks are roughly comparable. But higher rates of
unemployment and nonparticipation for young blacks imply lower rates of
unionism within the population. Moreover, blacks remain underrèpresented
in such heavily unionized occupations as the construction crafts andover—
represented in the service sector where unibnism is far less prevalent.
Using the above results to calculate the overall effects of unions
for young, blue—collar labor, it was shown that changes in theeconomy—
wide rates of union organization would raise overallwages and lower employ-
ment for both blacks and whites. However, young blacks should strongly
benefit in terms of both wages and employment from improved access to sectors
which are already unionized. Many young blacks would also benefit from
greater unionization of the sectors where they are heavily concentrated,




Union and nonunion workers need not be distinguished among the
unemployed, since union membership is often conditional on employment
or labor force participation. Union membership for many young workers
only comes after they have entered unionized crafts. Furthermore, many
laid—off unionists who are seeking other work do not report: their union
membership status, thus making it very difficult to estimate employment
of union and nonunion workers separately.
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Although I use the words "minority" and "black" interchangeably
in the paper, the sample always includes all nonwhite minorities.
3/
The analysis has been performed only for males, because racial
differences among females take a very different form and it is difficult
to come to general conclusions that apply to both sexes.
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